In this paper we extend Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) and examine the hypothesis that dividend increases (decreases) are associated with decreases (increases) in firms' information risk, which, together with the decreases (increases) in other systematic risks, contributes to the positive (negative) price changes surrounding dividend change announcements. Using Fama-French three-factor models augmented by an Information Risk factor, we find that, as predicted, dividend-decreasing firms exhibit an increase in information risk in the years after decrease announcements. However, our results on dividend-increasing firms are sensitive to the samples we use. Further analysis of the information characteristics of the dividend change firms indicates a reduction in analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility for dividend-increase firms and an increase in analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility for dividend-decrease firms in the years after dividend changes. Inconsistent with the prediction of traditional signaling models, dividend increase (decrease) firms do not exhibit an increase (a decrease) in future profitability.
Introduction
A long-standing literature in accounting and finance has documented that dividend changes are associated with changes in stock price of the same sign around the dividend change announcement (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 1988; Michaely et al., 1995) .
However, the same literature has consistently failed to produce evidence in support of another fundamental implication of the dividend signaling models -that dividend changes and future earnings move in the same direction. If dividend changes do not signal changes in future profitability, then why do we observe positive (negative) price changes for dividend increase (decrease) announcements? This lack of congruence between the intuitively appealing predictions of dividend signaling models and the empirical evidence to date suggests that dividend changes may convey information other than firms' growth in future cash flows, such as changes in risks (Allen and Michaely, 2002; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002) . Using Fama-French three-factor models Grullon et al. (2002) find that firms that increase (decrease) dividends exhibit decreases (increases) in market, size, and book-to-market betas, and conclude that the systematic risks for dividend-increase (decrease) firms decrease (increase) after their dividend changes. In this paper, we extend the Grullon et al. (2002) findings: we propose and examine the hypothesis that dividend changes are also associated with changes in the information risk of firms; that is, dividend increases (decreases) are associated with decreases (increases) in firms' information risk, which contributes to the positive (negative) price changes surrounding change announcement.
Recent theoretical research shows that firm-specific information risk is priced, and cannot be diversified away (Easely and O'Hara, 2001 , O'Hara, 2003 , Leuz and Verrechia, 2004 . These models imply that the precision of information reduces the risk premium demanded by uninformed traders in a multi-asset market. Based upon these theoretical models, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004, hereafter FLOS) argue that earnings quality is an important accounting determinant of information risk. They use accruals quality to capture firms' accounting information risk and explore the relation between earnings quality and the cost of capital.
1 FLOS (2004) find significant factor loadings on an "accrual-quality" factor in multi-factor asset pricing regressions, and interpret their findings as evidence that information risk is a priced risk factor. Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2004) lends further empirical support to the theoretical prediction that information risk is priced by the capital market by simultaneously examining the pricing of information risk and concomitant information-based trading by insiders. Consistent with this research, we define information risk as the probability that firm-specific information pertinent to investor pricing decisions is of poor quality. To the extent that earnings serves as an important information item investors use in making investment decisions, firms with poor earnings quality exhibit higher information risk.
To examine our central prediction that dividend changes convey information about changes in firms' information risk, we augment the Fama and French (1993) threefactor model by adding an Information Risk factor (IR factor) based on the FLOS (2004) accruals quality measure, and examine the factor loadings on this IR factor for dividend change firms before and after the dividend change announcement. Consistent with our prediction, we find that dividend-decreasing firms experience a significant increase in their information risk beta after dividend change announcement. Consistent with Grullon et al, we also find significant increases in market beta and B/M beta after dividend decreases. However, our results concerning the information risks of dividend-increasing firms are mixed and sensitive to the samples we use. Further examination of the information characteristics surrounding dividend changes reveals a reduction in analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility for dividend-increasing firms, and an increase in analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility for dividend-decreasing firms.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following three ways. First, instead of focusing on earnings changes of dividend change firms, we focus on changes in the non-diversifiable information risk of firms that announce changes in dividend payouts. Twenty years after the emergence of the first signaling models (Bhattachrya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985) , researchers are still grappling with the consistent lack of evidence in support of the basic prediction of these dividend signaling models: that firms adjust dividends to signal their prospects. The new evidence documented here not only deviates from, but also extends, the long-standing empirical literature focusing on earnings changes following dividend changes. We provide evidence that dividend-decreasing firms exhibit significant increases in their information risk after their change announcements, and thus reconcile the significant price decline in part with changes in firms' information risk.
Second, our study complements and extends research on the information content of dividend changes from a risk perspective. Grullon et al. (2002) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review relevant literature and develop our empirical predictions. In section 3 we describe our empirical design. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
Relevant Literature and Hypothesis Development

Dividend changes and hypothesis
Dividends and share repurchases are important forms of payout to shareholders of modern corporations. 2 The notion "the information content of dividends" originates in Miller and Modigliani (1961 alternative explanation, the "maturity hypothesis," to explain the price changes upon dividend change announcement. Specifically, they propose that as firms mature, they experience a concurrent decline in their investment opportunity set and systematic risk.
The decline in growth opportunities generates an increase in free cash flows, leading to an increase in dividends and a decrease in future profitability. The positive market reaction surrounding dividend increases indicate that the news about risk dominates the news about profitability. The maturity hypothesis represents an important deviation from the traditional dividend-signaling model. However, the maturity hypothesis cannot be applied to explain why firms decrease dividend payouts. In this paper we adopt a different approach, and argue that dividend changes contain information about changes in firms' systematic risk, including non-diversifiable information risk, without relating them to firms' life cycle. Our objective is to better understand the information content of dividend changes, and to relate firms' dividend policy to the cost of capital. We formalize our hypothesis, in alternative form, as follows:
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, dividend increasing/decreasing firms exhibit a decrease/an increase in their information risks, respectively.
Information risk and earnings quality
Recent development in accounting research shows that information risk, as
proxied by earnings quality, is priced by the market (FLOS 2004; Aboody et al., 2004) .
These empirical investigations are premised on recent theoretical research, which demonstrates that information risk is a non-diversifiable risk factor (e.g., Easley and O'Hara, 2001) . Easley and O'Hara (2001) advance the notion that uninformed traders require a premium to invest in risky assets in a multi-risky asset market with both informed and uninformed traders. In their model, informed traders are better able to adjust their portfolio weights in response to new information, some of which is private to them. As a result, uninformed traders face a form of systematic, non-diversifiable information risk, and will require a premium for bearing this information risk. The two implications of their model are: 1) the required risk premium increases with private information, and 2) the required risk premium decreases with the precision of public and private information. Our definition of information risk follows that of FLOS (2004). We define information risk as the probability that firm-specific information is of poor quality, and use earnings quality to capture this information risk. Thus, firms with poor earnings quality pose higher information risk (IR), and we expect to find an increase in IR for dividend decreasing firms and a decrease in IR for dividend increasing firms.
Empirical Design
Data and Sample
We form our test sample following Grullon et al. (2002 
Information Risk Factor
We use the FLOS (2004) AQ factor as our information risk factor in testing whether information risk changes surrounding dividend change announcements. 5 FLOS (2004) calculate the information-risk-factor-mimicking returns to a portfolio that takes a long position in stocks with the poorest accruals quality (AQ) and takes a short position in the best AQ stocks. 6 To obtain the factor mimicking returns, FLOS (2004) 
Changes in information risks surrounding dividend changes
We test for a change in the information risk of dividend change firms using the Fama-French (1993) multi-factor asset pricing model. We estimate the following Fama- We estimate this model from month t*-36 to month t*+36 (73 monthly observations) surrounding the month of dividend announcement (t*= month 0) for each dividend-changing firm. DT i,t is a dummy variable coded as 1 for months t >= t*, and 0 otherwise. R j,t is the monthly stock returns for firm j, R f,t is the monthly risk-free rates, and R m,t is the monthly return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted market portfolio. SMB t and HML t are the size and book to market factors, respectively. IR t is our information-risk factor from FLOS (2004).
In equation (2) α j represents the monthly risk-adjusted abnormal return of firm j before the dividend announcement, and α j,∆ represents the incremental or the change in risk-adjusted abnormal return after the dividend change announcement. β j , s j , h j , and e j are factor loadings of firm j with respect to R mt -R ft , SMB, HML, and the IR factors in the three years before the dividend change announcement. β j,∆ , s j,∆ , h j,∆ , and e j,∆ represent the changes in the factor loadings on the risk factors after the dividend announcement.
Our focus is on the factor loading e j,∆. We predict e j,∆ to be negative for dividend increase firms and positive for dividend decrease firms. That is, information risk decreases (increases) for firms that increase (decrease) dividends. For each sample firm with a dividend change we estimate model (2) over the 73 months and report the average of the coefficient estimates of these time-series models.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics on dividend-paying firms
We begin our empirical analysis by presenting descriptive statistics on firm characteristics of dividend change firms and by comparing the factor loadings of dividend-paying versus non-dividend-paying firms. We expect dividend-paying firms to exhibit less information risk than non-dividend-paying firms. Brav et al. (2003) report that dividend decisions are made very conservatively, as reflected in executives' extreme reluctance to start issuing dividends and their extreme reluctance to reduce dividends once they start paying dividends to shareholders. As a result, dividend-paying firms have more sustainable and stable earnings streams than non-dividend-paying firms and less volatility in earnings.
7 Table 1 tabulates the percentage dividend change, firm size in terms of total assets and market value of equity, and market to book ratios, fiscal year buy-and-hold returns, annual sales growth, return on assets, and change in return on assets for both dividend increasing and dividend decreasing firms, all measured at the beginning of the year. The mean (median) dividend increase per share in our sample is 30% (20%), whereas the mean (median) dividend decrease per share is 46% (50%). 8 Dividend-increasing firms appear to be smaller than dividend-decreasing firms both in terms of total assets ($2.5 billon vs. $3.6 billion) and market value of equity ($1.1 billion vs. $1.2 billion).
Dividend-increasing firms also appear to have higher market-to-book ratio, higher sales growth, higher stock return and return on assets than dividend-decreasing firms at the beginning of the dividend change year. The mean and median differences between dividend increasing and dividend decreasing firms on these variables are all significant at the 1% level.
Factor loadings of dividend-paying versus non-dividend paying firms
To better understand the information risk betas of dividend-paying firms, we compare the factor loadings of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. We also examine the different earnings persistence of these two sets of firms. We create two portfolios of firms: (1) firms that never pay dividends over our sampling period (April 1971 to March 7 Brav et al. (2003 document that among firms that do not currently pay out, 70% of the executives indicate that they never plan to issue dividends, and that the most important factor influencing the decision to eventually issue dividends is sustainable increases in earnings. Among firms that currently pay dividends, "executives consider the continuation of the existing level of dividends as (nearly) untouchable," and "the preservation of dividends equal to, and in some cases more important than, investment decisions." 8 These % changes are very close to those reported in Grullon et al. (2002) 
We test the difference in earnings persistence between dividend-paying and nondividend-paying firms using the following regression:
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where E i,t is operating income scaled by total assets, and D is a dummy variable coded as 1 for dividend-paying firms, zero otherwise. We expect to find earnings to be more persistent for dividend-paying firms versus non-dividend-paying firms, as has been documented by Skinner (2004) . More persistent earnings lead to less uncertainty surrounding firms' future earnings realizations, which would in turn lead to more information precision and less information risk. Thus a finding of a positive pdiv λ is consistent with dividend-paying firms having less information risk.
Results reported in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that dividend-paying and nondividend-paying firms have distinct risk characteristics. Dividend-paying firms have higher market and HML betas, and smaller size betas, and the differences ( pdiv β , , ) between the loadings are significant at 5% or higher. More importantly, dividend-paying firms load negatively on the information risk factor whereas the nondividend-paying firms load positively on the information risk factor, and the difference between the loadings ( ) is significant at 1% level. This suggests that dividendpaying firms are less risky in terms of information risk than non-dividend paying firms. The results also show that dividend-paying firms earn significant positive alphas (mean of 0.16% per month) whereas non-dividend-paying firms earn significant negative alphas (mean of -0.26% per month). Thus dividend-paying firms appear to perform better than non-dividend-paying firms. Overall, the results in Table 2 are consistent with our expectation that dividend-paying firms have lower information risk than non-dividend-paying firms. Table 3 tabulates the industry distribution of our sample firms by the sign of dividend change. Manufacturing firms dominate in both the dividend increases (37.8%) and dividend decreases (31.4%), followed by financial firms (23.8% and 28.2%).
Changes in information risk surrounding dividend change announcements
Overall, the industry distribution of firms across dividend increases and decreases are similar, except for utilities: only 3.2% of dividend increase firms are utilities firms, versus 11.9% of dividend decrease firms. Panel C reports the magnitude of dividend changes: the majority of dividend increases fall between 12.5% to 25%, whereas the majority of dividend decreases fall between 25% to 50%. Table 4 reports the results testing our central prediction using equation (2) Given that our evidence on dividend-increasing firms is sensitive to the two different samples used, to gain a better understanding of the economic circumstances surrounding dividend changes we next turn our attention to an examination of the information and operating characteristics of firms around the dividend change announcements. We focus our attention on the non-overlapping sample because this is a 'cleaner' sample and because our prediction on the information risk change for dividend increase firms does not hold in this sample.
Analysis of information characteristics surrounding dividend change announcements
If firms' information risks change after dividend changes, then we should be able to observe systematic changes in firms' information characteristics as well. We examine the dispersion of fiscal year 1 analyst earnings forecasts (DISP FY1 ) and the dispersion of analysts' long-term growth forecasts (DISP LTG ), measured as the standard deviation of forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast. Analyst forecast data are obtained from the I/B/E/S summary history file. We expect greater forecast dispersion to indicate greater uncertainty related to firms' future earnings and growth prospects. In addition, we also examine the standard deviation of stock returns, the standard deviation of operating cash flows (ST_CFO), and standard deviations of sales (SD_Sales), and the standard deviation of ROA (SD_ROA): higher standard deviation reflects higher volatility and greater uncertainty in the underlying earnings streams.
We compare the information characteristics of dividend change firms three years before the dividend change (-3 to -1) to three years after the dividend change (+1 to +3).
Year 0 is the year of dividend change announcements. We conduct our empirical analysis on the 1,946 non-overlapping observations and test the mean (median) differences using paired two-sample t tests (Wilcoxon signed rank tests). The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5 .
The results on analyst forecast dispersion indicate that both dispersion measures decrease (with the exception of the mean change in DISP FY1 , which is positive but not significant) for dividend-increase firms, suggesting the uncertainty surrounding future earnings and growth prospects for dividend-increasing firms decrease after the dividend increase announcements. In contrast, and as expected, for dividend-decreasing firms, both analyst forecast dispersion measures increase in the three years following dividend decreases, suggesting an increase in uncertainty with regard to future earnings and longterm growth for firms that decrease dividends. In addition, stock return volatility decreases for dividend-increase firms and increases for dividend-decrease firms in the years following the dividend change. Dividend-increase firms also experience decrease in cash flow volatility, ROA volatility, and sales volatility. The changes in these three volatility measures for dividend-decrease firms are not significant. Overall, our evidence on the information characteristics of firms is consistent with a reduction in information uncertainty for dividend-increase firms, and with an increase in information uncertainty for dividend-decrease firms.
Analysis of changes in profitability, payout, capital expenditure, and cash balance surrounding dividend change announcements
Our analysis above indicates that dividend change firms experience changes in information characteristics in the years following dividend changes. In this section we examine the Grullon et al. (2002) operating characteristics variables to see if their results hold in our sub-sample. The variables we examine include earnings growth rates, the dividend payout ratio, capital expenditure, and cash levels of dividend change firms.
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We first examine the change in earnings growth rate of dividend change firms. If the prediction of traditional signaling models holds, then we would expect to find increases (decreases) in profitability in the years after dividend increases (decreases).
Alternatively, Benartzi et al. (1997) suggests that instead of informing us about future earnings, dividend increases confirm a permanent increase in past earnings.
The profitability measure we use is ∆ROA, measured as the difference between two adjacent years' ROA. For the non-overlapping dividend-increase observations, ∆ROA decrease in the 3 years after the change (the median firm experiences a drop of 0.64% in ∆ROA). For the dividend-decrease observations, on the other hand, ∆ROA increases after the change (the median firm exhibits an increase of 0.64% in ∆ROA).
Thus the our non-overlapping sample results on firms' growth rate are qualitatively very similar to those reported by Grullon et al. (2002) on all dividend change events, including overlapping events. Taken together, our results suggest that dividend-increase firms experience a drop in earnings growth rate after the dividend change and the dividenddecrease firms' earnings grow at a higher rate after dividend decreases. These results are contrary to the central prediction of the traditional dividend signaling models, and the results on dividend-increasing firms are more consistent with the 'confirming-existingearnings' explanation advanced in Benartzi et al. (1997) .
We next examine the behavior of dividend payouts, capital expenditures, and cash balances. The dividend payout ratio is defined as the ratio of common dividends to net income before extraordinary items, capital expenditure is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, and cash balance is measured as the ratio of cash and shortterm investments to total assets. The results reported in Table 6 are largely consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis: in the three years after the dividend increase, on average payout ratios increase 11%, cash balances decrease by 1%, and capital expenditures remain the same when compared to 3 years before the change and decline by 6% when compared to the year of the change. For dividend decrease firms we observe decreases in payout ratios of 21% from the year of the change to 3 years after the dividend change (significant at the 1% level). Capital expenditures for these firms also decrease, and their cash balances remain unchanged. Thus, while the results are consistent with dividend-increasing firms having less investment need and hence more free cash flow, they also indicate less investment needs for dividend-decreasing firms.
Conclusion
Building upon Grullon et al. (2002) , who document that firms experience decreasing (increasing) market, size, and book-to-market betas after they increase (decrease) dividends, we investigate whether firms' information risks decrease after dividend increases, and increase after dividend decreases. Using the Fama-French threefactor model augmented by an Information Risk factor, we find that, as predicted, the dividend-decreasing firms' information risk beta increases in the three years after the dividend decrease announcements. We also find that for dividend-decrease firms analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility become larger, suggesting greater information uncertainty concerning the future prospects of dividend-decrease firms.
However, in our multi-factor return model analysis we do not find consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that dividend-increasing firms experience a decrease in information risks in the years after the dividend change. Further analysis shows that analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility become smaller after dividend increases. Our analysis on firms' operating characteristics surrounding dividend changes are consistent with the existing empirical findings that dividend increases (decreases) are not associated with future increases (decreases) in profitability.
In their recent survey of financial executives, Brav et al. (2003) report that managers rarely view dividends as a self-imposed costly tool to signal firms' ability and separate a company from its competitors. Skinner (2004) suggests that while dividends may have been a viable signaling tool in the early part of last century when managers had few means of communicating information other than using the financial statement themselves, changes in the ways managers communicate with the outside world may have rendered dividend signaling obsolete. Our results, coupled with the consistent lack of empirical support for the predictions of traditional dividend signaling models, suggest that the information contained in dividends is not about future earnings, but more about changes in firms' systematic risks, including information risks, and changes in the uncertainty regarding firms' future earnings and growth prospects. ∆Div: Dividend change in percentage between adjacent quarters when dividend change is between 12.5 percent and 500 percent TA: Assets of firms in millions, as of beginning of the dividend change year MV: Market value of equity, in millions, as of beginning of the dividend change year MTB: Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, as of beginning of the dividend change year BHR: Fiscal year buy-and-hold annual returns in percentage, as of beginning of the dividend change year Growth: Annual sales growth in percentage, as of beginning of the dividend change year ROA: Returns on assets in percentage measured as operating income before depreciation deflated by total assets, as of beginning of the dividend change year ∆ROA: Change in ROA in percentage measured as the difference between current and prior period ROA, as of beginning of the dividend change year.
*, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, two-tailed. Mean (median) differences are tested using two-sample t (Wilcoxon signed rank) tests. DT i,t is a dummy variable coded as 1 for months t >= t*, and 0 otherwise. t* is the month of dividend change announcement. R j,t is the monthly stock returns for firm j, R f,t is the monthly risk-free rates, and R m,t is the monthly return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted market portfolio. SMB t and HML t are the size and book to market factors, respectively. IR t is the information-risk factor.
, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, two tailed. * Notes: DISP FY1 :dispersion of analyst forecasts for fiscal year 1, measured as the standard deviation of forecasts for FY1 scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecasts for FY1. DISP LTG : dispersion of analysts' long term growth forecasts, standard deviation of long term growth forecasts, scaled by the absolute value of the mean long term growth forecasts SD_RET: Standard deviation of monthly stock returns less the risk free rate SD_CFO: Standard deviation of cash flows from operations deflated by total assets, measured over quarterly data SD_ROA: Standard deviation of ROA, measured over quarterly data SD_Sales: Standard deviation of total sales deflated by total assets, measured over quarterly data.
*, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, two-tailed. Mean (median) differences are tested using paired two-sample t (Wilcoxon signed rank) tests. All variables measured using annual data. ROA: Returns on assets measured as operating income before depreciation deflated by total assets ∆ROA: Change in ROA measured as the difference between current and prior period ROA PAYOUT: Ratio of common dividends to net income before extraordinary items CAPEX: Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets CashSTI: Ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets *, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, two-tailed. Mean (median) differences are tested using paired two-sample t (Wilcoxon signed rank) tests.
